70 Years Later:
Trying to Write the Last Chapter on Reconciliation
In the 1980s, Japan was at the height of
its “economic miracle.” Countries around
the world looked with (sometimes hostile) envy at Japan’s seemingly endless
growth and prosperity.[1] Perhaps in response to these factors,
Japanese nationalism and ultra-nationalism grew; books on Nihonjinron proliferated as beliefs in Japanese exceptionalism saw
a great resurgence in popularity.[2] At the same time, emboldened politicians began to openly defend Japan’s war
legacy in ways that deeply offended their neighbors. A series of “textbook crises erupted”
starting in 1982 as the Ministry of Education sought to tone down descriptions
of Japanese aggression during WWII.[3] Public figures began to make overt
comments that denied or diminished wartime atrocities;[4] although these
men often lost their jobs as a result, the increased tension in international
relations was evident. This decade also
saw “comfort women” come forward in large numbers for the first time to testify
about their sufferings during the war.[5] This
painful and volatile issue brought new shame and anger to the surface on both
sides.
Thus,
the 1980s was a period that both revived and reframed the debate on Japan’s war
legacy. It was a war of words between newly
resurgent and vociferous Japanese nationalists, foreign peoples who still felt
that Japan had been insincere in its apologies and had not done enough to make
amends, and certain individuals in Japan who wished to delve deeper into the
past in order to atone for the wrongs of their nation and—as in the case of
Kurahashi Ayako[6]—the
wrongs of their own family members. This
inflamed atmosphere, which persisted through the 90s and into the new
millennium, led to some very conciliatory WWII anniversary statements from
Prime Ministers Murayama (in 1995)[7]
and Koizumi (in 2005).[8] These statements were brief, humble,
reassuring, and to the point.
Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe’s statement in 2015, on the other hand, was clearly
intended to shift the arc of the debate.
Although he repeated much of what was said in the previous two
statements, he also went considerably further—notably by addressing the events
that led up to WWII. Murayama and
Koizumi had focused on expressing their regret and emphasizing all the good
that Japan had done since 1945, but Abe dared to openly “reflect upon the road
to war.”[9] By taking a more comprehensive, long-term
view of the “lessons of history,”[10]
Abe carefully set the stage for making an important break from his predecessors:
his desire to write the final, conclusive chapter of this 70-year narrative by bringing
an end to Japanese apologies for WWII.
 |
| PM Shinzo Abe |
PM
Abe’s official statement adheres closely to the report provided by his “Advisory Panel on
the History of the 20th Century and on Japan’s Role and the World Order in the
21st Century,” which he had created specifically for the 70th
anniversary of WWII. The panel consisted
of high-ranking figures from universities, research and policy institutes, major
corporations, and newspapers.[11] Although the report and Abe’s statement are
factually accurate, elements of Japanese national pride peep everywhere through
the cracks.
PM Abe begins by describing the threat of
Western colonialism in the early 20th century and the West’s
menacing technological supremacy. He
says:
“There is no doubt that the resultant
sense of crisis drove Japan forward to achieve modernization. Japan built a
constitutional government earlier than any other nation in Asia. The country
preserved its independence throughout. The Japan-Russia War gave encouragement
to many people under colonial rule from Asia to Africa.”[12]
Though
all of this may be true, the pride evident in these words and above all the
assertion that Japan provided “encouragement
to many people under colonial rule” may seem absurd and even offensive in light
of Japan’s violent betrayal of their promises of pan-Asian brotherhood. The original committee report acknowledges
(albeit amidst much equivocating) that Japan’s decisions during the war were “rarely […] made to
liberate Asia,”[13]
but this important note is absent from Abe’s statement. The
report also specifically cites Asian and African leaders from the 1960s “who had been deeply moved to hear
stories of the Russo-Japanese War from their forbearers”;[14] thus
the report makes it appear that Japan’s image as a positive role model survived
even all the carnage of WWII. One can
imagine, however, that people who suffered under Japanese rule would see this
as a very weak, hypocritical justification for Japan’s own colonialist behavior. By including this positive angle on Japan’s
pre-war legacy in his speech, Abe was undoubtedly trying to appease the
nationalist voters who were incensed by the far more humble statements issued
by Murayama and Koizumi years before.
Strikingly, certain arguments put forward
by PM Abe and the advisory panel also echo WWII Prime Minister Konoe Fumimaro’s
ideas from his 1918 article “Against a Pacifism Centered on England and America.”[15] They both describe the post-WWI “movement for self-determination,”[16]
complain about “economic blocs”[17]
created by Western countries that damaged Japan’s economy, and (in the report) decry the racist
policies of the American government at that time.[18] The advisory panel goes on to implicitly
blame the Western powers, and the U.S. in particular, for the failure of
Japanese leaders who favored “international cooperation” to maintain the “upper
hand,” claiming that “their influence was damaged” by America’s racist policies.[19] The advisory panel clearly conveys the anger
and frustration felt by many Japanese at being blamed for a war that erupted
out of their sense of helplessness and the unfairness of the Western-dominated system
in the 1920s and 30s. Abe then chose to
communicate this in his speech.
Abe also chose to conclude this litany of motivations
for the war with a strange, ambiguous statement: “In this way, Japan lost sight of the overall trends in the
world.”[20] This is perhaps the most intriguing line in
his entire speech, and it comes almost verbatim from the advisory report.[21] In the context of Abe’s statement, it sounds
as though he is summing up the entirety of Japan’s wartime mentality in that
sentence, casually glossing over the atrocities committed with the airy,
philosophical reflection that Japan simply fell out of sync with some enormous,
pre-destined path of human history. By
itself this line is incredibly hard to interpret; but it takes on new meaning in
the context of the advisory panel’s report.
Throughout the report, the advisors show a
peculiar concern for following “global trends”[22] and
going along with other nations. First,
they describe Japan’s colonization of Taiwan in the context of Western
colonization in Asia, and how “even the United States” followed this trend when
it took over the Philippines.[23] Then the committee emphasizes the growing
trend towards dictatorships in the 1930s, citing Germany, Italy, and the
U.S.S.R. as examples. They note that:
“The notion was spreading that this
was no longer the era of liberal democracy. / A policy of building a powerful
totalitarian political regime at home and demanding redistribution of the
colonies from the “haves” such as Great Britain and the United States abroad
gradually came to be accepted.”[24]
The
implication is that Japan was simply doing what other countries had already
done, and that democracy seemed like a failed institution at the time. This section also tacitly echoes (though without
necessarily endorsing) Fumimaro’s assertions that Japan had the right to
“ensure its survival”[25] through
expansionist military force if necessary.
Later, the report dedicates an entire
section to “The Development of International Law in the 20th Century,” and
takes great pains to describe how Japan took advantage of certain “loopholes”
in international law when they started the war; but that these loopholes have
since been eliminated by the United Nations, and Japan has been a model world
citizen ever since.[26] In this way, they can claim that Japan was
acting rationally and, to some extent, legally within the international system
of the time. They go on to remark that,
since 1945, “This course that the world has taken overlaps with the course
taken by Japan.”[27]
Thus, this preoccupation over “[keeping] steps with other nations,”[28]
as Abe puts it, is being held up as a standard for measuring Japan’s
actions. Being out of sync with world
trends is implicitly bad while being in sync is good, or at least normal and
understandable. Perhaps this
belief is rooted in Confucian values of communal unity and harmony: that it is
both expected and beneficial for everyone to remain within the social or
international norms, and that responsibility is both collective (the whole
world was responsible for the international situation) and hierarchical (the
leaders of Japan were responsible for their country) rather than individual. This use of global trends as a justification
for Japan’s actions is one of the trickier issues in dealing with the country’s
war legacy as an individual nation, especially since it brings up glaring
hypocrisies in Western dealings with Japan.
This juggling of responsibilities, between
Japan’s leaders and the world as a whole, continues as both the panel members
and PM Abe repeatedly acknowledge Japan’s wrongdoings, but also repeatedly
insist that a certain amount of culpability rests with other nations as
well. This is especially clear in the
remarkable footnote on the use of the word “aggression” in the advisory
report. The footnote includes several
qualifiers, including that “the definition of ‘aggression’ has not been
established under international law,” and that “there is a sense of reluctance
towards stating that only the actions of Japan constituted ‘aggression’ while
other countries were taking similar actions.”[29] Many Asian nations may feel that Japan has
not made suitable amends for WWII, but many Japanese feel that the West has not
made suitable amends for the colonialism of the 19th and 20th
centuries. They feel that Japan has been
unfairly singled out as the only non-Western colonial power.
Shinzo
Abe does make profuse apologies in his statement, and even goes so far as to
specifically address the issue of “comfort women” which neither Murayama nor
Koizumi did. In this way he offers reassurance
to foreigners and Japanese liberals, in contrast with the more nationalistic
parts of his speech. The entire
statement is a carefully orchestrated balancing act between the many divisive
factions arguing over these issues, and he offers something to everyone. However, it seems that Abe’s ultimate
solution to this controversy is to take a deliberately fatalistic approach,
declaring that, “History is harsh. What is done cannot be undone.” He goes on to say that, “no matter what kind
of efforts we may make, the sorrows of those who lost their family members and
the painful memories of those who underwent immense sufferings by the
destruction of war will never be healed.”
Finally, towards the end, we see what he’s been working towards:
“We
must not let our children, grandchildren, and even further generations to come,
who have nothing to do with that war, be predestined to apologize.”
Compared with Murayama and Koizumi’s
statements, this is bold and completely unprecedented. Abe immediately clarifies that he is not
abandoning Japan’s responsibility for the past—“Still, even so, we Japanese,
across generations, must squarely face the history of the past. We have the responsibility to inherit the
past, in all humbleness, and pass it on to the future”—but he believes, and the
panel report says,[30]
that Japan is already doing much of what it can and should do. They cite Japan’s tremendous ODA
contributions,[31] their
devotion to peace and nuclear non-proliferation, reparations paid to various
Asian and European nations,[32]
historical research exchanges,[33]
their commitment to a “free, fair and open international economic system,” and numerous
formal apologies.[34] Abe vows to continue Japan’s good works in
pursuit of “peace and prosperity,” but he also asserts that the time has come
for everyone to put the past to rest and allow Japan’s children to move forward
unshackled by the guilt of their ancestors.
All
of the historical facts in Abe’s statement are true, and the desire to make
sure that Japan’s innocent descendants will not “be predestined to apologize”
is entirely understandable; but the endless equivocations and justifications over
Japan’s wartime actions espoused by Abe, the advisory panel, and many Japanese
people are inappropriate and completely miss the point. An adherence to factual correctness is
admirable, and certainly, it is important to acknowledge that Japanese imperialism
did not come out of a vacuum. Other
countries were partially responsible for the conditions that gave rise to it,
and the West (including the Allied powers) have not been blameless.
However,
when one is talking about the murder, torture, and rape of millions of people,
there are no justifications or caveats. Their
repeated insistence that “we were just
doing what other countries did” sounds childish and absurd, and Japan’s
neighbors are understandably offended by it.
This attitude, in conjunction with persistent beliefs that the Japanese
are inherently superior to other peoples, deeply complicate efforts at
reconciliation. The section of the
report on Japan’s reconciliation with Korea is particularly revealing. It repeatedly and condescendingly describes
the Koreans as “waver[ing]
between […] reason and sentiment”[35]
in their post-war dealings with Japan, as if the Koreans are just moody
adolescents. The advisors fail to
acknowledge that perhaps economic aid and perfunctory apologies by Japanese
officials are not enough to reforge the bonds between the two nations. As Abe himself said, the sufferings caused by
the war may “never be healed” but they could be assuaged by creating and
encouraging more personal, individual connections to the war: like Kurahashi
Ayako’s visits to China,[36]
or like German schools where, via readings, projects, museum visits, and
meetings with Holocaust survivors, they teach their students to personally
relate to the sufferings of the Jews during WWII. These are the kind of connections that
engender real understanding and emotional sincerity. Rationalizing Japan’s actions during the war
will never be enough, but looking people in the face and trying to understand
what they went through could be. It would
be wonderful if Japan could do more of that before it’s too late and there are
no survivors left to talk to.
Unfortunately, that is not where PM Abe is leading his nation. Japan does not need to give up its national
pride or feel humiliated in order to be compassionate and apologetic; as long
as the Japanese fail to see that, however, the issue of reconciliation will
probably remain painful and unsatisfying for both sides.
[1] Andrew Gordon, A Modern History of Japan: from Tokugawa
Times to the Present, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University
Press, 2014), 291-292.
[2] Gordon, A Modern History of Japan, 299.
[3] Ibid, 295-296.
[4] Ibid, 296.
[5] Philip Seaton, “Historiography
and Japanese War Nationalism:
Testimony in Sensōron, Sensōron
as Testimony,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Volume 8, Issue 32
(2010): accessed April 28, 2016,
http://apjjf.org/-Philip-Seaton/3397/article.html.
[6] Philip Seaton and Kurahashi Ayako,
“War Responsibility and the Family in Japan: Kurahashi Ayako's My Father's
Dying Wish,” The Asia-Pacific Journal, Volume 8, Issue 32 (2010): accessed
April 28, 2016, http://apjjf.org/-Philip-Seaton/3396/article.html.
[7] Tomiichi Murayama, “On the
occasion of the 50th anniversary of the war's end” (statement, August 15,
1995), Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan: accessed April 16, 2016,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/press/pm/murayama/9508.html.
[8] Junichiro Koizumi, “Statement by
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi” (statement, August 15, 2005), Ministry of
Foreign Affairs of Japan: accessed April 16, 2016,
http://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/announce/2005/8/0815.html.
[9] Shinzo Abe, “Statement by Prime
Minister Shinzo Abe” (statement, August 14, 2015), Prime Minister of Japan and
His Cabinet: accessed April 16, 2016,
http://japan.kantei.go.jp/97_abe/statement/201508/0814statement.html.
[10] Abe, “Statement.”
[11] The Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th
Century and on Japan’s Role and World Order in the 21st Century, “Report
of the Advisory Panel on the History of the 20th Century and on Japan’s Role
and the World Order in the 21st Century” (August 6, 2015), contents.
[12] Abe, “Statement.”
[13] Advisory Panel, “Report,” 3.
[14] Ibid, 1.
[15] Konoe Fumimaro,
“Against a Pacifism Centered on England and America,” Nihon oyobi Nihonjin, December 15, 1918, reprinted in Japan’s View of the World (1995), 12-14.
[16] Abe, “Statement.”
[17] Ibid.
[18] Advisory Panel,
“Report,” 2.
[19] Ibid, 2.
[20] Abe, “Statement.”
[21] Advisory Panel,
“Report,” 3.
[22] Ibid, 3.
[23] Ibid, 1.
[24] Ibid, 2.
[25] Fumimaro,
“Against a Pacifism Centered on England and America,” 14.
[26] Advisory Panel,
“Report,” 4-5.
[27] Ibid, 5.
[28] Abe, “Statement.”
[29] Advisory Panel,
“Report,” 3.
[30] Ibid, 6.
[31] Ibid, 9.
[32] Ibid, 7.
[33] Ibid, 20.
[34] Abe, “Statement.”
[35] Advisory Panel,
“Report,” 27.
[36] Seaton and Ayako,
“War Responsibility and the Family in Japan.”
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